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Preliminary Report

U-2 RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS C395C and C405C
flown 20 and 21 July 1965

DST-PR/BYE/65-11
9 August 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Directorate of Science and Technology

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MISSION HIGHLIGHTS

Mission C395C, on 20 July 1965, overflew Hainan Island off south China for about 44 minutes. It yielded photographic coverage of 11 COMOR targets and 9 other targets of military interest. Chinese Communist air warning facilities tracked the flight almost continuously for over 4 1/2 hours. At least five fighters, probably MiG-17/MiG-19 aircraft, reacted to the flight but did not attempt an intercept. Two instances of operation of System 13* probably were caused by signals from fire control radars, but this cannot be verified because S-band Elint for the appropriate times is absent as a result of failure of the P- and S-band sections of System 6 (the Elint receiver.) No intercept attempts by surface-to-air missiles were noted.

Mission C405C, flown on 21 July 1965, was over the China mainland opposite Taiwan for one hour. It provided photographic intelligence on 26 COMOR targets and 5 other military and electronics targets. The Chinese Communists maintained an almost continuous radar track on the aircraft for over 3 hours. Some repeated activation of System 13 is judged to have resulted from almost continuous tracking by Chinese Communist S-band fire control radars while the U-2 was over denied territory. System 12* and the P-band section of System 6 were inoperative throughout the mission. No fighter aircraft reactions to the mission were detected. Contrails photographed by the U-2 southeast of Quemoy Island are believed to have been produced by friendly aircraft. No intercept attempts by surface-to-air missiles were noted.

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See figure 1 (opposite) for mission routes and tables 1 and 2 for COMOR targets covered.

*System 12 warns the pilot and System 13 jams the S-band signals from the SA-2 FAN SONG target and missile tracking radar.

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CONTENTS

	Page
MISSION HIGHLIGHTS	iii
BACKGROUND	1
ANALYTICAL FINDINGS	2
Mission C395C	2
Air defense reactions	2
Elint analysis	3
Photography	3
Mission C405C	3
Air defense reactions	3
Elint analysis	4
Photography	4

TABLES

1.	COMOR targets, Mission C395C	5
2.	COMOR targets, Mission C405C	6
3.	Air defense radars intercepted	8

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Preliminary Report

U-2 RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS C395C and C405C flown 20 and 21 July 1965

BACKGROUND

Mission C395C, flown 20 July 1965, was planned against COMOR targets on northern, western, and southern Hainan Island. The weather was good, as predicted, and the pilot reported the mission flown as planned, with all targets covered. The U-2 was over denied territory for 44 minutes out of a total flight time of 5 hours and 16 minutes.

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The following day (21 July 1965) a [redacted] mission, C405C, was launched. This mission was designed to satisfy priority requirements of [redacted] arising from a temporary reduction of [redacted] capabilities. The U-2 flew directly from [redacted] to a point halfway between Hong Kong and Swatow, thence north along the coast to Fu-ting. The pilot's report indicated good weather throughout the one hour over denied territory. The total flight time was 3 hours and 21 minutes.

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ANALYTICAL FINDINGS

Mission C395C
20 July 1965

AIR DEFENSE REACTIONS

Radar Tracking -- The mission aircraft was continuously and accurately tracked by Chinese Communist radar facilities for a total of 1,642 nautical miles at a computed ground speed of 370 knots. Tracking began at 0125Z, [redacted] 25X1

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was one discrepancy of more than 10 nautical miles between the Chinese Communist track and the pilot's reported flight path, as the U-2 was approaching the northeastern corner of Hainan Island. The pilot deviated from his planned flight path in this area because of haze, which may have caused him to err in the estimate of his position.

Altitude reports passed by the Chinese Communists on the U-2 ranged from 55,760 to 68,897 feet. The pilot reported an average altitude of 70,500 feet.

Fighter Reactions -- At least five Chinese Communist fighters were noted in two reactions to the mission on the basis of ground-to-air GCI traffic. None of the aircraft evidently attempted to intercept the U-2. The first reaction, probably from Hai-Kou, was tracked to within three nautical miles ground range of the U-2. There is no evidence that the reacting aircraft approached the height of the U-2. The second reaction, identified as four aircraft, evidently flew out of Ling-Shui. It was tracked to within 15 miles of the U-2 at closest approach. The highest altitude reported for the reaction was 39,360 feet. This is consistent with the fact that the pilot sighted a contrail from the reaction, and the lower level of contrail formation on 20 July was about 40,000 feet. On the basis of reported altitudes and computed speeds, the reacting aircraft are believed to have been MiG-17/MiG-19 types.

Missile Reactions -- There were no indications of surface-to-air missile (SAM) or air-to-air missile (AAM) threats to the mission.

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PHOTOGRAPHY

Preliminary interpretation of the photography indicates that the mission covered 1 suspect missile target, 6 airfields, 4 naval facilities, 2 BW/CW installations, 7 military establishments, 1 industrial target, and 1 urban area. In all, 11 COMOR targets were covered. Figure 2 is an example of the photography acquired by the mission.

Mission C405C
21 July 1965

AIR DEFENSE REACTIONS

Radar Tracking -- Chinese Communist radar facilities maintained an almost continuous, accurate track on the U-2 from 0240Z to 0540Z -- [redacted] 25X1

or a total of 1,225 nautical miles at a computed ground speed of 394 knots and reported altitudes of 62,320 to 68,880 feet. The pilot reported altitudes averaging 71,900 feet. His reported flight path agrees with the Chinese Communist radar track within 15 nautical miles for all but a segment of about 50 nautical miles along the coast north of Amoy, where the Chinese track appeared to be slightly erratic.

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Fighter Reactions -- No fighter reactions to the mission were detected. Contrails photographed by the mission some 40 nautical miles southeast of Quemoy Island probably were produced by friendly aircraft in the area.

Missile Reactions -- There were no indications of surface-to-air missile (SAM) or air-to-air missile (AAM) threats to the mission.

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PHOTOGRAPHY

Preliminary interpretation of the photography indicates that the mission covered 7 airfields, 2 naval facilities, 3 electronic targets, 18 military installations, and 1 urban area. In addition, the U-2 photographed contrails of aircraft in flight (banking toward the camera) about 40 nautical miles southeast of Quemoy Island. In all, 26 COMOR targets were covered by the mission.

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SOURCES

This preliminary technical evaluation of two U-2 reconnaissance missions flown over parts of south and southeast China on 20 and 21 July 1965 was developed for the 303 Committee by the following elements of the Directorate of Science and Technology:

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ERRATA

Report DST-PR/BYE/65-10, 15 July 1965, *U-2 Reconnaissance Missions C355C and C365C flown 2 and 3 July 1965,* should have the following corrections inserted:

Page/Line	As Published	Should Be
[redacted]		

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